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Key Points 
 Neuroimaging shows cognition in some patients without motor responsiveness 
 This improves clinical and pain management of chronic disorders of consciousness 
 It permits selection for thalamic deep brain stimulation and plasticity enhancement 
 Awareness depends on frontoparietal & mesocircuit functional connectivity 
 Multi-center studies are offering evidence-based diagnostic and prognostic tests  
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Abstract 
The past fifteen years has provided an unprecedented collection of discoveries that bear 
upon our scientific understanding of recovery of consciousness in the human brain following 
severe brain damage. Highlighted among these discoveries are unique demonstrations that 
patients with little or no behavioral evidence of conscious awareness may retain critical 
cognitive capacities and the first scientific demonstrations that some patients, with severely 
injured brains and very longstanding conditions of limited behavioral responsiveness, may 
nonetheless harbor latent capacities for significant recovery. Included among such capacities 
are particularly human functions of language and higher-level cognition that either 
spontaneously or through direct interventions may reemerge even at long time intervals or 
remain unrecognized. Collectively, these observations have reframed scientific inquiry and 
further led to important new insights into mechanisms underlying consciousness in the human 
brain. These studies support a model of consciousness as the emergent property of the 
collective behavior of widespread frontoparietal network connectivity modulated by specific 
forebrain circuit mechanisms. We here review these advances in measurement and the 
scientific and broader implications of this rapidly progressing field of research. 
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Measuring consciousness in the severely damaged brain: the need for motor-
independent signs of awareness derived directly from brain signals 
 
A brief history of coma 
The invention of the artificial respirator in the 1950s made it possible for many patients 
to ―survive‖ their brain damage and led to the redefinition of death based on brain function 
criteria (i.e., brain death or irreversible coma with absent brainstem reflexes, and to the 
identification of locked-in syndrome or pseudo-coma (for review see e.g., Laureys, 2005b). It 
also led to some patients ―awakening‖ from coma (i.e., opening their eyes) but remaining 
without behavioral signs of awareness or communication. In 1972 Jennett and Plum defined 
this ―artifact of intensive care‖ as ―persistent vegetative state‖ (VS) (Jennett, 2005); the 
designation had a mechanistic intent to identify that such patients at the bedside showed only 
residual autonomous nervous functioning such as sleep-wake, respiration, digestion and 
thermoregulation originating at a brainstem level. Previously VS had been called ―apallic 
syndrome‖ (meaning ―without cortex‖, a description we will see below is not correct). 
―Persistent‖ VS was used to denote that the condition lasted for more than one month. In 
1994, a retrospective study defined the temporal boundaries for irreversibility of VS and 
proposed the term ―permanent VS‖ (The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994). 
Unfortunately persistent and permanent VS share the abbreviation ―PVS‖ often leading to 
unwarranted confusion. More recently physicians can refer to VS (which for some can be 
misguided as ―vegetable‖-like) using a more descriptive and neutral term ―unresponsive 
wakefulness syndrome‖ (UWS) (Laureys et al., 2010). However, some authors (including 
NDS) feel that UWS lacks a mechanistic interpretation and might lead to underspecification 
and conflation of the newly identified syndrome of significant cognitive function in some 
patients with the appearance of VS. In 2002, the publication of the operational criteria for 
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―minimally conscious state‖ (MCS) (initially called ―minimally responsive state‖) separated 
patients showing a range of behavioral signs of awareness up to inconsistent but not reliable 
communication from the broader category of severe disability (Giacino et al., 2002). 
Emergence from MCS was defined by functional communication or functional use of objects.  
Figure 1 illustrates how functional neuroimaging studies have, over the past 15 years, 
progressively changed the spectrum of coma and chronic disorders of consciousness. While 
some VS patients will irreversibly remain in this condition, we now know that many actually 
evolve to MCS (Monti et al., 2010a). Since its formal definition nearly 10 years ago (Giacino 
et al., 2002) a number of authors have questioned the need for disentangling VS from MCS 
considering both patient groups as hopelessly brain damaged. While such a conflation has 
always implied a failure to adhere to the strict definitions of VS, as MCS explicitly 
subcategorizes patients within the overly broad category of severe disability and not a subset 
of patients that would have fulfilled the definitional criteria for VS. As we will see, recent 
studies have demonstrated it is important to disentangle both clinical entities as functional 
neuroimaging have shown differences in residual cerebral processing and hence, conscious 
perception (Boly et al., 2008a; Coleman et al., 2009; Rodriguez Moreno et al., 2010; 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010), as well as important differences in outcome (e.g., Luaute et 
al.). The clinically heterogeneous entity of MCS can be further subcategorized in MCS+ 
(describing high-level behavioral responses such as command following or specific responses 
to linguistic content) and MCS- (describing low-level non-reflex behavior such as visual 
pursuit, localization of pain or appropriate smiling to emotional stimuli) (Bruno et al., 2011b). 
After emergence from MCS most patients‘ cognitive functional remains at least initially 
below the normative ranges captured by standard neuropsychological test batteries; this range 
of function has been labeled confusional state and is characterized using quantitative 
behavioral metrics designed to capture this patient population (Nakase-Richardson et al., 
 6 
2008; Sherer et al., 2005). Disambiguating the boundary between MCS and emergence into 
confusional state, however, has been shown to have ambiguities with respect to developing 
strict operational criteria (Nakase-Richardson et al., 2008). Finally, we propose a modified 
application of the term ―functional locked-in syndrome‖ suggested by other authors (Giacino 
et al., 2009) to characterize patients who unambiguously demonstrate a dissociation between 
preserved higher cognitive functions only measurable by functional imaging techniques while 
showing extremely limited motor-responsiveness during bedside clinical testing. This 
designation should be reserved, however, for patients who show consistent and reliable 
communication using non-speech and non-gestural communication through direct brain 
signaling.  
 
The challenge of measuring consciousness  
For neurologists, consciousness can be reduced to arousal (i.e., wakefulness or 
vigilance) and awareness (i.e., comprising all subjective perceptions, feelings and thoughts) 
(Posner et al., 2007). Awareness in turn can be divided into ―external awareness‖ (i.e., 
sensory or perceptual awareness of the environment) and ―internal awareness‖ (i.e., stimulus-
independent thoughts, mental imagery, inner speech, daydreaming or mind wandering) 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Clinically, arousal is typically measured by examining eye-
opening and reproducible command-following to establish proof of (external) awareness. 
Additionally, the presence of spontaneous or induced non-reflexive behaviors are considered 
as evidence of (minimal) consciousness (MCS-). The bedside examination of consciousness 
in severely brain damaged patients, however, is extremely challenging because movements 
can be very small, inconsistent and easily exhausted, potentially leading to diagnostic errors. 
This issue is further complicated when patients have underlying deficits in the domain of 
verbal or non-verbal communication functions, such as aphasia, agnosia or apraxia (Bruno et 
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al., 2010a; Majerus et al., 2009; 2005). This problem was highlighted in a study showing that 
the clinical consensus diagnosis of VS was incorrect in more than 40% of patients (Schnakers 
et al., 2009b). Locked-in syndrome patients may also be mistakenly considered unconscious 
(Bruno et al., 2009a; Laureys et al., 2005; Smart et al., 2008). These studies should urge 
clinicians to use standardized validated behavioral scales of consciousness when making a 
diagnosis in these challenging patients. It is currently recommended to use the Coma 
Recovery Scale - Revised (Giacino et al., 2004) rather than to perform an unstructured clinical 
assessment (Schnakers et al., 2009a) or to use unsuitable scales such as the Glasgow Coma 
Scale (Bruno et al., 2011a; Schnakers et al., 2006) when aiming to disentangle VS from MCS. 
However, given that our clinical measurement of consciousness can be severely compromised 
when a patient lacks motor responsiveness, functional neuroimaging in principle offers a 
more direct and objective tool to measure residual cognition in severely brain-damaged 
patients (Laureys, 2004; Schiff, 2006). In practice, however, as discussed below application 
of functional imaging techniques to patients with disorders of consciousness are often difficult 
and ambiguous with respect to resolving diagnostic uncertainty.  
Below we discuss the role of positron emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in ―resting state‖, passive sensory stimulation and active 
―command following‖ and ―communication‖ paradigms in this context. We will see how, 
over the past 15 years, the old monolithic model inferred from considerations of anatomic 
pathology and early region-of-interest based FDG-PET imaging have been refined through 
the use of a variety of new functional neuroimaging analytical tools (e.g., Laureys et al., 
2000b; 1999a) and techniques (e.g., H215O PET Menon et al., 1998a; Laureys, 2000 #2912 
and MEG Ribary et al., 1998; Schiff et al., 1999) identifying functional disconnections in the 
truly vegetative brain and showing variations of cerebral substrate in related conditions, 
currently being further refined by fMRI (e.g., Bardin et al., 2011a; Monti et al., 2010b), 
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quantitative EEG (e.g., Fellinger et al., 2011; Goldfine et al., 2011) and event-related potential 
studies (e.g., Boly et al., 2011). 
 
Measuring the brain at “rest”  
Fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) studies have shown a 
global and massive decrease in brain metabolism in VS (De Volder et al., 1990; Levy et al., 
1987; Rudolf et al., 1999; Tommasino et al., 1995). Voxel-based statistical analytical tools 
next permitted to recognize not only global or a priori defined region-of-interest changes in 
brain function but more detailed data-driven regional differences and more importantly 
assessed changes in effective connectivity when VS was compared with healthy conscious 
waking. This permitted to identify an impaired widespread fronto-parietal network 
encompassing midline (i.e., anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cingulate/precuneus) 
and lateral (i.e., prefrontal and posterior parietal) associative cortices (Laureys et al., 1999a; 
1999b; Lull et al., 2010). These observations have since been confirmed (Beuthien-Baumann 
et al., 2003; Bruno et al., 2010b; Juengling et al., 2005; Nakayama et al., 2006; Silva et al., 
2010). The functional connectivity studies showing that VS is a cortico-cortical (Laureys et 
al., 2000b; 2002b; 1999a) and thalamo-cortical (Laureys et al., 2000b) disconnection 
syndrome led to the hypothesis that consciousness is an emergent property of frontoparietal 
connectivity (Baars et al., 2003; Laureys, 2005a). Functional neuroimaging studies on 
conscious perception in healthy volunteers (Dehaene, 2000; Rees et al., 2002) as well as data 
obtained in sleep (for review e.g., see Maquet, 2010) and general anesthesia (for review e.g., 
see Boveroux et al., 2008) also corroborates this theory.  
 
Development of ―consciousness classifiers‖ for clinical use has followed these 
observations with new studies showing evidence that automatically assessing the functional 
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integrity in this frontoparietal network and calculating a probability of being VS or conscious 
but ―locked-in‖ can be based on objective FDG-PET data (Phillips et al., 2010). Structural 
MRI studies such as diffusion tensor imaging also permit to quantify lesions to the brain‘s 
white matter tracts in severe brain injury, often invisible to conventional radiological 
approaches (Newcombe et al., 2010) and may help differentiating VS from MCS (2010a). 
FDG-PET imaging was also employed to help clinicians to better understand possible clinical 
signs of (un)consciousness. Bruno et al (2010b) showed that anoxic VS patients with or 
without visual fixation presented an identical impairment of frontoparietal network 
metabolism and connectivity, concluding that visual fixation is not necessarily a clinical sign 
reflecting conscious awareness. Resting state fMRI studies have shown that the midline 
frontoparietal ―default mode‖ connectivity, thought to reflect internal awareness (i.e., 
spontaneous thoughts, inner speech and mind wandering) (Boly et al., 2008b; Soddu et al., 
2009; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011), disappears in brain death (Boly et al., 2009) and 
decreases in VS (Boly et al., 2009; Cauda et al., 2009; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) (table 1). 
MCS patients showed an intermediate pattern with a higher functional connectivity of the 
posterior cingulate/precuneus area as compared to unresponsive patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et 
al., 2010) – confirming the above-discussed FDG-PET results. Interestingly, the authors also 
showed a linear correlation between behavioral CRS-R total scores and ―default mode 
network‖ connectivity. The study of VS patients who subsequently recovered offered an 
additional causal link between consciousness and the functional integrity of this long-range 
frontoparietal network – pointing to the role of non-specific (central intralaminar) thalamic 
projections in the support of these large-scale distributed cortico-cortical connections 
(Laureys et al., 2000b). These conclusions were strongly supported by the Schiff et al (2007) 
discussed below who successfully performed deep-brain stimulation of these diffusely 
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projecting thalamic nuclei improving behavioral responsiveness and awareness of a post-
traumatic MCS patient. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
From “Activation” studies to passive stimulations 
 Menon et al. (1998b) first claimed to have demonstrated residual ‗cognition‘ in a VS 
patient using functional neuroimaging techniques. In their study, a VS patient had differential 
15
O labeled water PET responses in extrastriate higher-order visual cortical regions when 
presented with structured visual images and scrambled versions of the same images. The 
inference that such isolated cerebral activations demonstrated cognition was controversial 
(Menon et al., 1999; Schiff and Plum, 1999) and to date, as discussed below, passive 
paradigms producing higher-level cortical activations remain ambiguous evidence for level of 
awareness or cognitive function, if the term is reserved for an element of intentionality of 
perception.  
Table 2 summarizes functional neuroimaging activation studies using 
15
O labeled 
water PET and fMRI to identify blood flow increases in response to passive external 
stimulation in severely brain-damaged patients. The first PET activation studies showed that 
for most typical VS patients a ―low level‖ cortical activation encompassing primary auditory 
(Boly et al., 2004; Laureys et al., 2000a; Owen et al., 2002; Schiff et al., 2002), 
somatosensory (Boly et al., 2008a; Laureys et al., 2002b) or visual (Giacino et al., 2006; 
Menon et al., 1998a) cortices can be observed. fMRI and magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
studies have corroborated these findings (Bekinschtein et al., 2005; Coleman et al., 2007; 
Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2008; Heelmann et al., 2010; Rousseau et al., 2008). As compared to 
VS, functional neuroimaging studies in MCS showed a higher level of functional segregation 
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(i.e., more widespread activation) and functional integration (i.e., more functional long range 
connectivity with frontoparietal ―awareness‖ networks) for both auditory (Boly et al., 2004) 
and noxious processing (Boly et al., 2008a). The latter study, showing evidence of residual 
pain perception in MCS has obvious clinical consequences. In this study MCS patients 
demonstrated activation of the entire ‗pain matrix‘, a distributed cortical and subcortical 
network linked to pain perception that importantly included the anterior cingulate and insular 
areas thought to be important in the affective emotional perception of pain (Kupers et al., 
2005). These findings should strongly influence physicians to systematically use analgesic 
agents in MCS patients, even if (by definition) they cannot communicate their sensations 
(Schnakers et al., 2010). A recently proposed ―pain scale‖ specifically developed for use in 
disorders of consciousness now permits monitoring of nociception/pain and guidance for the 
adaption of analgesic treatment (Schnakers et al., 2010).  
Functional neuroimaging studies have also aimed to address the question whether 
severely brain-damaged patients perceive emotions. A series of studies have illustrated that 
intense or emotionally relevant stimuli induce higher-level activation in MCS (for review 
(Laureys and Boly, 2007). In the auditory modality, these studies have used presentation of 
meaningful stories told by a relative (Bekinschtein et al., 2004; Schiff et al., 2005) or auto-
referential stimuli such as the patient‘s own name (Di et al., 2007; Laureys et al., 2004b; Qin 
et al., 2010). The latter studies, for example, show activation of midline structures (i.e., 
anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cingulate/precuneus) known to be involved in 
internal or self-consciousness (Laureys et al., 2007). Qin et al. (2010) reported a linear 
correlation between activation of the anterior cingulate cortex and the level of consciousness 
as quantified by coma recovery scores.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
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Mental imagery tasks to show fMRI based command following and communication 
The most important advance in the use of neuroimaging of disorders of consciousness 
has been the development of novel paradigms that provide unambiguous imaging evidence of 
volition and awareness. These studies have led to the identification of new and likely specific 
syndrome. Owen et al. (2006) reported a collaborative study between the Cambridge and 
Liège groups that demonstrated a post-traumatic patient diagnosed in VS who could follow 
commands when assessed using a novel fMRI paradigm thus contravening her clinical 
examinations and apparent diagnosis. When the patient was asked to imagine playing tennis, 
activation was observed in the supplementary motor area. The instruction to imagine moving 
around in her house resulted in parahippocampal activation. These specific activations 
patterns were not different from those previously observed in a cohort of healthy volunteers 
(Boly et al., 2007). Similar ―active‖ or ―command following‖ paradigms have been tested in 
severe brain-damaged patients with different technologies such as fMRI, EEG, event related 
potentials or electromyography (see table 2). In a next step, Monti and Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 
(2010b) adapted this methodology to establish evidence of fMRI-based communication in a 
single subject with the presumptive diagnosis of VS and thus provided the first proof-of-
concept for a neuroimaging based communication in an otherwise unresponsive patient. It 
should be stressed that the absence of command-related brain activation (i.e., a negative 
result) does not permit to make strong claims about the absence of consciousness. Similarly, 
the presence of fMRI based command following signals does not guarantee the potential for 
the patient to use these signal for a reliable and consistent communication system. Bardin et 
al. (2011b) demonstrated two examples where fMRI based command following did not lead 
to communication using this signal. In one of these two patients, the investigators provided 
test-retest confirmation of the dissociation of positive fMRI command following but negative 
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fMRI communication. Variations on the Monti and Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010b) paradigm 
in this allowed for intermediate responses to be generated so that patients may attempt but not 
complete or so delayed responses adding to the complexity of assessment of communication 
capacities (Bardin et al., 2011a; 2011b). ―Active‖ fMRI paradigms in patients with disorders 
of consciousness are now being used with various methodologies, asking patients to: ―look at 
a screen and silently name the objects as they appear‖ (resulting in language network 
activation) (Rodriguez Moreno et al., 2010); ―move the hand‖ (resulting in premotor cortex 
activation) (Bekinschtein et al., 2011) and ―imagine swimming‖ (resulting in supplementary 
motor area activation). 
 Concurrently, cheaper and portable techniques using event related potential, 
quantitative EEG, or electromyography ―active‖ paradigms have been developed to detect 
possible signs of command following not assessable by clinical behavioural examination. 
Schnakers et al. (2008b) presented a list of names (including the own name) and showed that 
some MCS patients, when instructed to count a target name, showed an increase in amplitude 
of the ―P3‖ potential (known to vary with attention) (none of VS patients could do the task). 
This paradigm also permitted to detect consciousness in a rare case of total locked-in 
syndrome (i.e., characterized by complete immobility including eye movements), 
behaviorally diagnosed as comatose (Schnakers et al., 2009a). This methodology was also 
adapted by asking patients to count the number of deviant trials in an auditory oddball series 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2009a). Goldfine et al. (2011) have developed quantitative EEG methods 
to implement the methodologies of Owen et al. (2006) in fMRI for command following and 
have demonstrated similar variations in linking behavioral evaluations to directly measured 
brain-signal evaluations of command following seen in the Bardin et al. (2011b) study. 
Finally, Bekinschtein et al. (2008) could show subclinical movements by means of 
electromyography recordings, when patients were asked to move their hand.  
 14 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Table 3 offers an overview of the fMRI, EEG, evoked potential and EMG studies 
aiming to show signs of consciousness and communication not accessible by bedside 
behavioral examination. The absence of functional brain activity in response to the 
instructions can have many possible causes, ranging from test-dependent technological 
(corrupted signals due to movement or other artifacts often encountered in these patients and 
especially troublesome in fMRI experiments - e.g. see (Soddu et al.)) to patient-dependent 
fluctuations in arousal (spontaneous or medication related), perceptual sensory or cognitive 
insufficiencies (the discussed mental imagery, motor or attentional tasks indeed require 
preservation of different cognitive processes such as visual, auditory, language and working 
memory functions). When negative results do not necessarily reflect proof of the absence of 
consciousness, positive results are informative and relatively easy to interpret as a proof of 
consciousness.  
The neurological community at present has no diagnostic category for patients showing 
only signs of consciousness or communication on ancillary fMRI or evoked potential studies 
such as the ones discussed above (2010b; 2006). Patients who can perform motor imagery 
tasks on command or use these complex mental imagery tasks to communicate, cannot be 
considered as VS or even MCS. For patients who ultimately demonstrate consistent and 
reliable communication using solely adjunctive technologies we here propose to call this 
condition ―functional locked-in syndrome‖, following the suggestion of this term by other 
authors (Giacino et al., 2009) but delimits the use to recognize that there is uncertainty when 
cognitive level cannot be measured and evidence for patients who can only demonstrate 
command following using the technique. Command following using fMRI mental imagery 
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nonetheless underscores a marked dissociation between an extreme behavioral motor 
dysfunction and preserved higher cognitive functions identified by functional imaging 
techniques and likely identifies patients near the level of functional locked-in state even if a 
failure of communication using the method should preclude their labeling with this term.  
In conclusion, some patients who awaken from their coma may fail to show any 
behavioral sign of awareness (VS), or they may remain unable to communicate (MCS). The 
clinical management of these disorders of consciousness remains very challenging, but 
technological advances in neuroimaging are now offering new ways to improve our diagnosis. 
It is an exciting time as the behaviorally defined gray zones between the different disorders of 
consciousness in the clinical spectrum following coma are being challenged by increasingly 
powerful imaging technology. This short review illustrates how increasing our understanding 
of the neural correlates of consciousness is helping clinicians doing a better job in terms of 
diagnosis, prognosis and finally, we hope, treatment and drug development (e.g., the use of 
functional imaging in demonstrating the effect of amantadine (Schnakers et al., 2008a) and 
methylphenidate (Kim et al., 2009) on ―consciousness‖-networks). Increasing evidence from 
functional neuroimaging and electrophysiology demonstrates some residual cognitive 
processing in a subgroup of patients. The current challenge remains to continue translating 
this research from the bench to the bedside – within a well-defined ethical frameworks (e.g., 
see Fins et al., 2008a; Fins and Schiff, 2010; Schiff et al., 2009). Only well-controlled large 
multi-center neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies will enable to identify which para-
clinical diagnostic or prognostic test is necessary, at any given time, for our routine evidence 
based assessment of individuals with chronic disorders of consciousness. 
 
Building a scientific model of recovery of consciousness: linking insights from 
spontaneous recovery and the impact of effective interventions 
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Building on these new measurements and insights gained into the physiology of the 
vegetative brain from studies carried out the late 1990s and early 2000s, investigations began 
to focus on characterizing differences in brain function between VS patients and patients who 
at first glance looked similar, those in MCS (Laureys et al., 2004a). These early observations 
provided hints of significant functional variation in the brains of some patients fulfilling the 
clinical criteria for the diagnosis of vegetative state (Menon et al., 1998a; Owen et al., 2002; 
Schiff et al., 1999; Schiff and Plum, 1999; Schiff et al., 2002); however, later studies that 
provided direct comparisons of functional neuroimaging in VS and MCS patients 
demonstrated several fundamental differences separating these patient populations and normal 
subjects that provided new insight into possible differences in underlying brain mechanisms.  
Unlike VS patients, patients with behavioral assessments indicating levels of function 
consistent with MCS demonstrated evidence of functionally connected networks as 
demonstrated by response to different types of sensory stimuli including passive simple 
auditory, somatosensory and complex language stimuli. In MCS patient such stimuli 
produced activation of large-scale brain network responses across multiple cortical regions 
beyond the primary sensory cortices (Boly et al., 2004; Coleman et al., 2007; Hirsch et al., 
2001; Laureys et al., 2004b; Schiff et al., 2005). Although MCS patients demonstrated 
evidence of functionally connected large-scale networks similar to normal subjects with clear 
variations in the quality of response and resting metabolic patterns, significant differences in 
the volume of overall and regional brain activation measured using fMRI were seen 
identified, with decreased blood-oxygen dependent level signal seen in MCS patients 
compared with the normals. In addition, novel stimulus selective response patterns appeared 
in some MCS patients. Passive language stimuli presented as normal speech or in time-
reverse produced wide dissociation of large-scale network activation in MCS patients 
suggesting a fundamental difference in resting brain state compared with normal subject 
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testing using the same paradigm (Hirsch et al., 2001; Schiff et al., 2005). Quantitative studies 
of resting cerebral metabolism in MCS patients also showed significant differences from 
normal subjects with resting global metabolic rates measured near ~50% of normal (Laureys 
et al., 2004b; Schiff et al., 2005); these values are comparable with values found in 
pharmacologic coma and vegetative state. Taken together, with the studies of passive stimuli 
in MCS patients, these findings suggested that relatively intact cerebral integrative processes 
remained, but like the unreliable behavioral responsiveness seen in these patients, neuronal 
responses were similarly unstable.  
Important differences between MCS and normal subject responses were not only 
identified and seen in the quality of overall network responses in both the absolute level of 
BOLD activation in response to stimuli (Boly et al., 2008a; Laureys et al., 2004b; Rodriguez 
Moreno et al., 2010; Schiff et al., 2005; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) but also in the overall 
resting metabolism of a regional selective zone in the mesial parietal regions of the brain as 
assessed using FDG-PET separated MCS from normal subjects (Laureys et al., 2006; 1999b). 
In a series of related studies, Laureys et al. have identified a grading of recovery of 
metabolism and functional connectivity of cortical regions within the posterior medial 
complex (mesial parietal cortex, precuneus, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex) (Vogt et 
al., 2006 ; Vogt and Laureys, 2005). These brain regions are known to have a very high 
resting metabolic rate that dominates the pattern of resting brain activity and may represent a 
‗default‘ state as proposed by Raichle (2007). Similarly, functional correlations of resting 
blood-oxygen level dependent signals arising within these cortical regions define a ‗default 
mode‘ network in resting functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. These observations 
compare directly with other demonstrations that large frontal-parietal association cortex 
regions show decreases in functional connectivity and relative blood flow in unconscious 
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brain states including anesthesia and non-convulsive seizures (reviewed in Brown et al.; 
Laureys, 2005a).  
 Several independent lines of evidence have also long implicated the functional 
integrity of mesial frontal, midbrain and central thalamic systems in the graded level of 
recovery of consciousness seen across patient after an initial coma (reviewed in Posner et al., 
2007). Included are long-standing observations that selective, bilateral lesions of the central 
midbrain and thalami can produce enduring disorders of consciousness. Although many 
patients show slow recovery from such injuries (Katz et al., 1987; van Domburg et al., 1996), 
persistent fluctuations in behavioral responsive are typical (Stuss et al., 1988; Van Der Werf 
et al., 1999) and similar to fluctuations seen in MCS patients with non-selective patterns of 
brain injury. Multi-focal brain injuries are known to have a disproportionate impact on the 
integrity of the central thalamus (Maxwell et al., 2006) along a continuum with chronic 
vegetative state associating with marked neuronal loss across central thalamic nuclei (Kinney 
et al., 1994; Maxwell et al., 2006). Based on the evident potential for recovery after enduring 
disorders of consciousness in some MCS patients and the impact of non-selective brain 
injuries on deafferenting these critical thalamic regions, Schiff (1997) proposed a strategy for 
patient selection based on fluctuations in conscious behaviors and selection of specific regions 
of the central thalamus for electrical stimulation. Supporting this approach, Laureys et al. 
(2000b) found evidence that spontaneous recovery from VS to MCS or higher levels of 
function correlated with increased functional connectivity between the intralaminar regions of 
the thalamus and the prefrontal cortices and restoration of metabolism in prefrontal cortex and 
central thalamus.  
A proof-of-concept study demonstrated that despite long-standing MCS level function, 
a patient 6 years after injury recovered multiple cognitively-mediated behaviors after 
placement of bilateral central thalamic deep brain stimulation electrodes (Schiff et al., 2007). 
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The patient selected was one of two MCS first demonstrated to retain large-scale cerebral 
network response to passive language stimulation despite markedly depressed rates of global 
metabolism as shown in figure 5. In this patient central thalamic DBS restored arousal 
regulation and promoted improved behavioral responsiveness; the patient had remained 
unable to communicate reliably via eye-movements or gestures, feed orally, organize 
functional movements, or speak during the 6 year period prior to the study. Figure 5b 
illustrates the bilateral placement of the electrodes in the central thalamus, and Figure 5c 
graphs the main results of the intervention. Behavioral baseline evaluations showed no change 
in behavioral responsiveness as compared to functional levels measured more than 2 years 
before the start of the trial. Across the trial quantitative behavioral assessments demonstrated 
significant improvements when compared against the 6 month pre-stimulation baselines that 
were unambiguously statistically linked to the deep brain stimulation intervention (see Schiff 
et al., 2007). Importantly, observed carryover effects of improvements from the ON to the 
OFF state were also identified as seen in the marked differences in the OFF state baselines 
during the formal trial of the intervention that had accumulated during a five month titration 
period of exposure to brain stimulation (see Supplementary Data from Schiff et al. 2007 and 
discussion below).  
 
Modeling consciousness 
An organizing mesocircuit model provides an economical explanation of the 
vulnerability of the anterior forebrain in the setting of widespread deafferentation and 
neuronal cell loss associated with a variety of severe brain injuries that produce unstable 
levels of behavioral responsiveness associated with MCS and patients just past the border of 
MCS in confusional state (see Figure 6). The primary consequence of broad deafferentation 
following either diffuse multifocal patterns of corticothalamic disconnection or bilateral 
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injuries to afferent pathways providing forebrain arousal emanating or passing through the 
upper brainstem and central regions of the thalami is disfacilitation, a passive 
hyperpolarization of neurons that reduces their firing rates (Schiff, 2010). Experimental 
studies demonstrate that powerful consequences on background firing rates occur even with 
disfacilitation producing only modest reductions in cerebral blood flow (Gold and Lauritzen, 
2002). The common denominator in all disturbances of consciousness following severe brain 
injuries may be the circuit-level consequences of a broad decrease in background synaptic 
activity and excitatory neurotransmission Within the anterior forebrain circuit as illustrated in 
Figure 6, the medium spiny neurons of the striatum have a key role as a gate via their 
inhibitory projections to the globus pallidus interna which in turn inhibit the central thalamus. 
The thalamocortical projections from the central thalamus strongly innervate both the frontal 
cortex and the striatum (see refs for further details Schiff, 2010). This mesocircuit model 
efficiently predicts both the impact of central thalamic deep brain stimulation and a variety of 
specific pharmacological interventions known to be in some cases effective in improving 
behavioral responsiveness in severely brain-injured patients. Among these other interventions 
several observations note the well-known response to dopaminergic agents of severely brain-
injured patients. Schnakers et al. (2008a) showed specific changes in frontoparietal 
metabolism induced by amantadine (Figure 6B). Consistent with the proposed model, 
dopaminergic facilitation of the output of the medium spiny neurons or direct modulation of 
mesial frontal cortical neurons would explain the restoration of anterior forebrain activity 
within the loop connections of the frontal cortex, striatum, pallidum and central thalamus. 
Perhaps the most counterintuitive set of observations of behavioral improvements associated 
with pharmacological interventions in MCS patients accounted for by the model is the quite 
paradoxical phenomenon of marked behavioral facilitation occasionally observed with 
administration of the sedative agent zolpidem (a non-benzodiazepine hypnotic that potentiates 
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GABA-A alpha 1 receptors, (Brefel-Courbon et al., 2007; Clauss and Nel, 2006; Schiff and 
Posner, 2007). A correlation of modeling and physiological studies demonstrate the EEG 
shows elements of normalization with zolpidem which are strongest in patient measurements 
over the anterior forebrain, see Figure 6C (Schiff and Laureys unpublished, Drover et al., 
2010; Williams et al., 2009). 
 
A common model for changes in precuneus/posterior medial parietal complex and 
anterior forebrain mesocircuit during recovery of consciousness. 
Both anatomical and physiological studies demonstrate a strong link between the central 
thalamus and the posterior medial cortical regions. Track tracing studies in non-human 
primates identify the intralaminar thalamic nuclei targeted by the deep brain stimulation in the 
study shown in Fig 6 as providing a broad innervations of all components of the posterior 
medial complex of the parietal lobe (Buckwalter et al., 2008) whereas each individual region 
has stronger point to point connections with other individual thalamic nuclei. A recent human 
anesthesia study found that both the thalamus and precuneus showed selective significant 
decreases regional blood flow during anesthetic coma compared with wakeful baseline and 
notably increase blood flow selectively with recovery of consciousness achieved during stable 
anesthesia with administration of system cholinergic agonist (Xie et al., 2011). In the human 
thalamus, the central lateral nucleus and surrounding paralaminar regions receive the heaviest 
innervations of both brainstem and basal forebrain cholinergic systems and project widely to 
supergranular cortical regions (Heckers et al., 1992; Van der Werf et al., 2002). Of note, 
activation of midline central regions by evoked response from the left DBS electrode, which 
generated bilateral patterns of activation, was demonstrated for patient shown in Figure 5 (see 
Supplementary data from Schiff et al. 2007). This pattern of evoked cerebral activity is 
consistent with projections from the central thalamus to medial parietal cortical regions. 
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Taken together, these lines of evidence support a linkage of the observed patterns of increased 
metabolic activity and functional connectivity across both the anterior forebrain and medial 
parietal cortex via increased thalamocortical activation through the central thalamus that has 
broad and highly effective projections. 
 
Slow structural modifications of the brain during recovery from disorders of consciousness.  
Late recovery of function following severe brain injury may be associated with 
structural changes in the brain. Voss et al. (2006) demonstrated evidence of ongoing structural 
modifications using diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging (DTI), in a man who at age 
40 spontaneously recovered full expressive and receptive language, after remaining in MCS 
for 19 years following a severe traumatic brain injury. DTI quantifies the anisotropy of proton 
diffusion and thus is a proxy for axonal fiber integrity. Despite DTI evidence of widespread 
white matter injury, a longitudinal assessment of this patient identified regions that showed 
significant change in measured fractional anisotropy over a 18 month time period beginning 
over 20 years following injury. Notably, markedly increased fractional anisotropy was present 
in the mesial parietal cortices and nearby cortical regions that reduced in the second study. 
These regions showed high metabolic activity in FDG-PET studies obtained at both time 
points and suggest that recovery of function may have correlated with activity and structural 
remodeling in these regions that as noted above play an important in the baseline resting 
brain. Importantly, similar changes were seen in the patient midline cerebellum that directly 
correlated with observed clinical improvements in motor control between the two studies. 
Supporting these findings a prospective cohort study of severely brain injured patients 
followed for a year following initial injury, found very similar changes in DTI measured 
fractional anisotropy in the patients who recovered neurological function including evidence 
of increases in fractional anisotropy to supranormal levels in some brain regions (Sidaros et 
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al., 2008). Other studies have suggested that differences in DTI measured quantities may 
separate levels of recovery from vegetative state to MCS (Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2010a).  
 Dynamical changes in brain function can occur over surprisingly long time intervals in 
MCS. The proposed circuit mechanisms discussed above provides a mechanism by which a 
significant ‗switch-like‘ change in overall forebrain activation may occur at a threshold 
allowing release of increasing thalamocortical/striatal outflow but do not account for evidence 
of slow continuing improvements evident in carryover effects associated with deep brain 
stimulation (Schiff et al., 2007) or pharmacological interventions (Brefel-Courbon et al., 
2007; Schnakers et al., 2008a). These observations require other mechanisms that in addition 
to axonal regrowth likely include changes in synaptic efficacy, pools of available receptors 
and other fundamental alterations in the cellular profile of individual neurons over time as 
brain state changes. 
In summary, it appears that the most fundamental new insights into brain mechanisms 
underlying human consciousness derived from studies of severe brain injuries to date are 
related to large-scale patterns of brain activity essential to support the conscious state. Two 
main patterns have emerged from studies as reviewed above: 1) a strong link of resting 
metabolism in medial parietal cortex/posterior medial complex (precuneus, retrosplenial, 
posterior cortex) indexing levels of functional recovery across disorders of consciousness 
from coma to emergence from minimally conscious state, and 2) a key role for the central 
thalamus in regulation of anterior forebrain activation ranging from switch-like reactivation to 
more graded contributions correlated with behavioral responsiveness. Both mechanisms are 
likely reflections of one common dynamical process of progressive increases in neuronal 
activity within the corticothalamic systems as consciousness recovers and specific markers of 
the essential large-scale mesocircuits that must reestablish baseline patterns of activity for 
brain-injured patients or anesthetized normal subjects to regain consciousness (Boveroux et 
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al., 2010; Brown et al.; Noirhomme et al., 2010; Schrouff et al., 2011). In addition, new 
studies are providing insight into detailed dynamics associated with mental activities and 
evidence that changes in internal brain dynamics may be consistent with conscious awareness 
and higher level brain function after severe brain injury thus enlarging the set of observations 
to be accounted for by neuroscientific models of consciousness. 
 
Next steps and broader implications  
It is an exciting era for the field of brain injury and disorders of consciousness. The 
gray zones between the different clinical entities in the spectrum following coma are 
beginning to be better understood and defined by the increasingly powerful neuroimaging 
technologies. As we have here briefly discussed a yet to be determined minority of patients 
who are currently considered to be ―vegetative‖ or unresponsive, show fMRI or EEG/ERP 
based signs of consciousness that are inaccessible to clinicians‘ motor-response dependent 
behavioral assessment. These ever improving technological means are changing the existing 
clinical boundaries and will permit some ―non-communicative‖ and locked-in (Bruno et al., 
2009b; Gosseries et al., 2009; Laureys et al., 2005) patients to correspond their thoughts and 
wishes and control their environment via non-motor pathways. It is clear from this overview 
that our understanding of consciousness and disorders of consciousness after coma is 
currently witnessing a significant paradigm shift (Laureys and Boly, 2008; Owen et al., 2009).  
 
For clinical medicine, the directions are fairly clear. The most important challenge now 
is to move from the above discussed single case reports and small cohort reports to large 
multi-centric studies further addressing the sensitivity and specificity of the discussed ―high-
tech‖ ancillary neuroimaging or electrophysiological tools. Moreover, these early studies are 
also showing the potential prognostic value of the technique (Coleman et al., 2009; Di et al., 
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2008). Indeed, VS with absent or low-level brain activation (i.e., the majority of the studied 
cases) have lower chances of subsequent recovery as compared to those with higher-level 
activation (i.e., activation extending to associative multimodal cortices). The latter pattern of 
activation is often (albeit not always) encountered in MCS patients (Zhu et al., 2009). In 
addition to MRI diffusion tensor imaging (Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2010b; Tollard et al., 
2009; Tshibanda et al., 2010; Tshibanda et al., 2009), functional MRI also seems to herald 
prognostic information (Coleman et al., 2009; Di et al., 2008) showing that VS patients with 
absent or ―low-level‖ sensory cortex activation may have worse outcomes as compared to 
patients showing ―higher-level‖ of associative cortex activation. Similarly, 
electrophysiological studies have aimed to predict outcome; a recent standardized 
classification method of routine ―resting state‖ EEG showed a correlation at the group level 
with 3-months outcome measures (Bagnato et al., 2010). In a retrospective study of ―resting 
state‖ routine EEG from 50 VS patients, Babiloni et al. (2009) showed that increased alpha 
wave power correlated with recovery at 3-months. Cologan et al. (2010) recently reviewed the 
literature on sleep-wake EEG recordings, discussing the positive predictive value of sleep 
―spindle‖ waves for recovery of consciousness (Landsness et al., 2011). Using evoked 
potentials and ―passive‖ auditory oddball stimuli, the presence of a ―P300‖ wave to rare 
stimuli correlated with recovery of consciousness in 34 patients with post-traumatic VS 
(Cavinato et al., 2009). Finally, the presence of Pavlovian eye-puff trace conditioning has 
been proposed as a new marker of learning, correlating with recovery (Bekinschtein et al., 
2009b). While it is clear that although not all patients harbor significant reserve capacities, 
many do and those half-way recovered will very likely benefit from more systematic and 
generalizable knowledge concerning the recovery process. In order to propose such validated 
evidence based algorithms specifying when and what investigation needs to be performed in 
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which patient for diagnostic or prognostic purposes, much more research efforts and funding 
are required to achieve these goals. 
For the science of human consciousness the next steps are more likely to surprise than 
be strongly anticipated given the complexity of the problem. As more sophisticated 
measurements of brain function are applied to patients with near normal cognitive states who 
cannot speak or gesture our measurements will continue to confront our conceptual 
limitations of how such capacities are formed in the brain. As noted above, many new and 
innovative paradigms and analyses are appearing expanding the database and giving 
additional insights into the problem. In a not so far future, it is possible that real-time fMRI 
based communication (Sorger et al., 2009) or evoked potential brain computer interfaces will 
be used to address important clinical and ethical questions such as feeling of pain and 
discomfort (Laureys and Boly, 2007). On the other hand, recent demonstrations that the 
injured brain may signal accurate communication with distinct patterns of basic brain 
responses compared to those of normal subjects (e.g. delayed hemodynamic signals (Bardin et 
al., 2011a; 2011b); or EEG signals multiplexed in to novel frequency patterns (Fellinger et al., 
2011; Goldfine et al., 2011), will challenge the easy translation of these techniques developed 
to communicate with cognitively intact subjects. Moreover, it is yet unclear whether in the 
absence of nuanced initiation of speech or gesture, whether the quality of such 
communications will ever reach a standard acceptable to adjudicate clinical and legal 
judgments (Fins and Schiff, 2010).  
Finally, this evolving field of work sets several broad and important challenges for 
medical ethics. As each discovery as come forward a marked ethical reframing continues 
occur with the shifting models of recovery, diagnosis and prognosis (Fins, 2009a, b). These 
frames will continue change as these studies evolve and require that policies for patients with 
disorders of consciousness keep up with the times. Moreover, for the group of patients with 
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capacity to communicate these scientific discoveries bear on their fundamental rights for 
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Figure 1 Changing view on chronic disorders of consciousness.  
The monolithic way of looking at severe brain damage (in grey) is being replaced by a more 
graded nosology (in white) based on quantitative behavioral assessments and functional 
neuroimaging methods. The simplified graph illustrates that patients in erroneously diagnosed 
as ―vegetative/unresponsive wakefulness‖ state (VS), itself a syndrome previously considered 
to be uniformly hopeless, are now often being identified as within the subcategory of severe 
disability as in ―minimally conscious state‖, with further refinement suggested by some 
authors as MCS- (i.e., showing non-reflex movements), MCS+ (i.e., with fluctuating 
command following shown by clinical testing) (Bruno et al., 2011b). Emergence from MCS is 
typically followed by entry into confusional state with further recovery depending on integrity 
of motoric function leading to normative cognitive function which may co-exist with nearly 
no motor output (locked-in state) or absolutely no motoric function ―functional locked-in‖ 
(i.e., with consistent communication via innovative functional neuroimaging techniques—for 
which at present there is no demonstrated example in the published literature). 
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Figure 2. Loss of functional connectivity and modularity in the vegetative state.  
A. Effective connectivity impairment in fronto-parietal consciousness network measured at 
rest (Laureys et al., 1999a).; B. Residual parahippocampal face area activation (Menon et al., 
1998a) ; C. Residual low-level auditory activation disconnected from fronto-parietal network 





Figure 3. Role of posterior medial complex in process of recovery of consciousness. 
A. Precuneus and adjacent posterior cingulate cortex (red triangle) is most active in conscious 
waking, most impaired in vegetative, preserved in locked-in and minimally active in 
minimally conscious states (Laureys et al., 2004a); B. Recovery of from VS is paralleled by 
recovery of metabolism in this area (in yellow) shown by FDG-PET (Laureys et al., 1999b); 
C. Late recovery of communication following chronic MCS is paralleled by possible axonal 
regrowth in this area shown by diffusion tensor MRI (Voss et al., 2006). 
 32 
 
Figure 4. Assessment of command following and communication using functional 
neuroimaging. 
Mental imagery tasks showing signs of consciousness (Owen et al., 2006) and communication 
(A. Monti et al., 2010b) (B. Bardin et al., 2011a) in severely brain damaged patients. 
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Figure 5. Proof of concept that central thalamic deep brain stimulation can facilitate 
recovery of behavioral responsiveness in the chronic minimally conscious state. 
A. Residual activation of language areas in post-traumatic MCS (Schiff et al., 2002); B. 
Bilateral thalamic stimulation in this selected patient improved clinical status (Schiff et al., 
2007).
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Figure 6. Linking models of spontaneous and induced recovery of consciousness: the 
possible interactions of the anterior forebrain mesocircuit and posterior medial 
complex. 
A. Mesocircuit hypothesis based on amantadine, zolpidem and DBS-induced recovery 
(Schiff, 2010); B. Amantadine-induced activation of frontoparietal network (Schnakers et al., 
2008a); C. Restoration of fluctuations in coherence in a single zolpidem responsive patient 





Table 1. Functional neuroimaging data of the past 25 years measuring brain function in ―resting state‖ conditions using (1) fluorodeoxyglucose 
positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) and (2) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in chronic disorders of consciousness. 
Study N° Diagnosis Etiology Duration  Main findings 
1. FDG-PET      
(Levy et al., 1987) 7  VS TBI/NTBI 1-72m 60% (53-67%) decrease in metabolism 
(De Volder et al., 1990) 7  VS NTBI 1-4m 53% (43-65%) decrease in metabolism 
(Tommasino et al., 1995) 10  VS TBI/NTBI  2-24m 56% decrease in metabolism 
(Plum et al., 1998) 3 VS TBI/NTBI  50% decrease in metabolism with significant regional variations 
(Laureys et al., 1999a) 4  VS TBI/ NTBI <1m-60m FP hypometabolism & disconnections 
(Laureys et al., 1999b) 1  VS NTBI 1m 38% decrease in metabolism; recovery of consciousness = FP recovery  
(Rudolf et al., 1999) 24  VS NTBI <1m-6 m 25% decrease in metabolism (17% <3m and 33% >3m) 
(Schiff and Plum, 1999) 1 VS NTBI 240m 50% decrease in metabolism with significant regional variations 
(Laureys et al., 2000b) 1  VS NTBI 4m  recovery of consciousness = thalamocortical reconnections  
(Rudolf et al., 2000) 9  VS NTBI <1m decrease in benzodiazepine receptor density 
(Laureys et al., 2002a) 30  VS TBI/ NTBI 1-5m 56% (37-72%) decrease in metabolism  
(Schiff et al., 2002) 5 VS TBI/NTBI 6m-240m 50%(31-87%) decrease in metabolism with regional variations 
(Beuthien-Baumann et al., 2003) 16  VS TBI 2-12m  58% decrease in metabolism; FP hypometabolism 
(Tengvar et al., 2004) 1 MCS NTBI 6m 47-65% FP hypometabolism  
(Juengling et al., 2005) 5  VS NTBI 1-48m FP and thalamus hypometabolism 
(Nakayama et al., 2006) 30 17 VS TBI 6-60m FP and thalamus hypometabolism in VS, less impaired in MCS 
  13 MCS   less impaired in MCS 
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(Silva et al., 2010) 10  VS TBI/ NTBI  2-24m FP hypometabolism 
(Lull et al., 2010) 17  VS & MCS TBI 12m thalamus hypometabolism 
(Bruno et al., 2010b) 10  VS NTBI 3m FP hypometabolism ( VS without fixation = ―MCS‖ with fixation) 
2. fMRI      
(Boly et al., 2009) 1  VS NTBI 36m FP disconnections  
(Cauda et al., 2009) 3  VS  TBI/NTBI 20m FP disconnections 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) 
13 4 VS & 5 coma TBI/NTBI  <1-60m 
FP disconnections correlate with consciousness level 
 4 MCS   
 
Note. N= Number of patients; VS = vegetative state; MCS = minimally conscious state; FP= frontoparietal associative network; TBI=traumatic brain injury; NTBI=non traumatic brain injury; m=months 
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Table 2. Functional neuroimaging studies measuring brain activation to ―passive” sensory stimulation using (1) H2
15
O PET (2) MEG and (3) 
fMRI in chronic disorders of consciousness.  
Study N° Diagnosis Etiology Duration Passive stimulation  Main findings 
1. H2
15O-PET       
(de Jong et al., 1997) 1  VS TBI 2m auditory (familiar voice) High level activation 
(Menon et al., 1998a) 1  VS NTBI 3m visual (familiar face) Low level activation 
(Laureys et al., 2000a) 5 VS TBI/NTBI 3-38d auditory (click) Low level disconnected 
(Laureys et al., 2002b) 15  VS TBI/NTBI 1m pain (electrical stimulation) Low level disconnected 
(Owen et al., 2002) 3 1 VS TBI/NTBI 4m visual (familiar face), auditory (noise, words) Low level activation 
  2 VS    High level activation 
(Kassubek et al., 2003) 7  VS NTBI 3-48m pain (electrical stimulation) High level activation 
(Boly et al., 2004) 20 15 VS TBI/NTBI 1-4m auditory (click) Low level disconnected 
  5 MCS    High level connected 
(Laureys et al., 2004b) 1 MCS NTBI 6m auditory (noise, cries, own name)  High level activation 
(Owen et al., 2005) 1  VS NTBI 4m auditory (speech)  High level activation 
(Giacino et al., 2006) 5  VS TBI/NTBI 1-3m visual (flash) Low level activation 
(Boly et al., 2008a) 15  VS   1-4m pain (electrical stimulation) Low level disconnected 
 5 MCS    High level connected 
(Silva et al., 2010) 10  VS TBI/NTBI  2-22m tactile Low level activation 
2. MEG       
(Schiff et al., 2002) 5 5 VS TBI/NTBI 6-240m auditory (click)/tactile Low level activation 
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3. fMRI       
(Bekinschtein et al., 2004) 1 MCS TBI 5m auditory (familiar voice) High level activation 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2005) 1  VS TBI 2m auditory (words) Low level activation 
(Schiff et al., 2005) 2 MCS TBI/NTBI 18m auditory (speech), tactile High level activation 
(Owen et al., 2006) 1  VS TBI 6m auditory (speech, ambiguity), visual High level activation 
(Staffen et al., 2006) 1  VS NTBI 10m auditory (own name) High level activation 
(Di et al., 2007) 11 5 VS TBI/NTBI 2-48m auditory (familiar voice own name ) Low level activation 
  2 VS    High level activation 
  4 MCS    High level activation 
(Coleman et al., 2007) 12 4 VS TBI/NTBI 9-108m 
auditory (forward/backward speech, 
ambiguity) Low level activation 
  3 VS    High level activation 
  5 MCS    Low/high level activation 
(Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2008) 7 2 VS TBI 1-11m auditory (forward/backward speech) Low level activation 
  1 VS    High level activation 
  4 MCS    Low/high level activation 
(Rousseau et al., 2008) 4 VS NTBI 60m tactile, visual and auditory Low level activation 
(Coleman et al., 2009) 46 20 VS TBI/NTBI 2-120m 
auditory (forward/backward speech, 
ambiguity) Low level activation 
  7 VS    High level activation 
  19 MCS    Low/high level activation 
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(Zhu et al., 2009) 9 MCS TBI/NTBI 1-2m visual (emotional picture) High level activation 
(Qin et al., 2010) 11 7 VS TBI/NTBI 2-48m auditory (familiar voice own name) Low level activation 
  4 MCS    High level activation 
(Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2010b) 1  VS TBI 1m  auditory (speech forward/backward) High level activation 
(Heelmann et al., 2010) 6 6 VS TBI 
<2 m, >6 
m visual (flash) Low level activation 
  1 MCS  14m  High level activation 
 
Note. N= Number of patients; VS = vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; FP= frontoparietal associative network ;TBI=traumatic brain injury; NTBI=non traumatic 




Table 3. Functional neuroimaging studies using ―active” tasks assessing (1) consciousness or (2) communication using fMRI, evoked potentials 
or electromyography in chronic disorders of consciousness. 
Study Technique N°  Diagnosis  Etiology Duration Active task Main findings 
1. Assessing consciousness  
Owen et al. 2006  fMRI 1 VS TBI 5m Motor and spatial 
mental imagery 
Activation of supplementary motor area for motor task. Activation of 
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal and premotor cortex for 
spatial task 








12d-24y Silently names 
counting 
Increased P3 amplitude in 9MCS when counting target name 
Bekinschtein et 
al. 2008  




- Motor Increased EMG activity when asked to move in 1VS and 2MCS. 
Schnakers et al. 
2009 
ERPs 1 Total LIS NTBI 25d Silently names 
counting 
Increased P3 amplitude when counting target name 
Bekinschtein et 
al. 2009  









Global regularities violation effect in 2 MCS and 1LIS 




22m Motor and spatial 
mental imagery 
Activation of supplementary motor area for motor task in 4VS and 
1MCS. Activation of parahippocampal gyrus for spatial task in 3VS 
and 1MCS 
Rodriguez 









20m Silently picture 
naming 
Activation of left superior temporal, inferior frontal and pre-









10d Motor task Activation of contralateral dorsal premotor cortex in 2VS 




6m-3y Motor mental 
imagery 
Activation of supplementary motor area in 2MCS and 1LIS 
2. Assessing communication  










Correct responses in expected brain regions in 5 out of 6 questions 




6m-3y Binary and 
multiple choices 
tasks 
Incorrect responses in expected brain regions in 1 MCS 
fMRI: functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; ERPs: Event Related Potentials; EMG: Electromyography; VS: Vegetative State; MCS: Minimally Conscious State; EMCS: Emerged from Minimally Conscious State ; 
LIS: Locked-In Syndrome; NA: Not Applicable; d: days; m: months, y: years; TBI: traumatic brain injury; NTBI: non-traumatic brain injury. 
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